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Incentivizing Credit Rating Agencies under
the Issuer Pay Model Through a Mandatory
Compensation Competition1
Robert J. Rhee

C

redit rating agencies assign credit ratings to
bond issues and issuers. Most public bonds carry
a credit rating. Credit ratings impact the price at
which bonds are issued in their primary market and
traded in secondary markets, and the assessment of
risk in the portfolios of investors. These factors are
directly linked to the regulation of bond investors
such as banks, broker-dealers, insurers, investment
funds, and other financial institutions.
Although rating agencies are some of the most
important institutions of the global capital markets,
they have long been criticized for poor performance.
Most recently, they failed to rate accurately structured
finance instruments during the years leading up to the
financial crisis of 2008–2009. The systematic overrating of complex structured finance securities inflated
valuations and investor demand, reduced the perception of risk, and permitted wholesale investments in
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de facto junk bonds by regulated financial institutions. The financial crisis would not have occurred
had rating agencies performed properly.2 Rating
agencies are important monitors of the global financial industry.
Reform of the industry is one of the most important unresolved agendas of post-financial crisis market
regulation. Congress, the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC), the securities industry, and scholars are actively scrutinizing the problem. Proposals
include promoting more competition among rating
agencies, imposing greater civil liability, changing rating agency compensation structures from issuer-pay to
user-pay models, and substituting credit ratings with
market metrics. For reasons explained in earlier articles,
these reform proposals are problematic and are most
likely infeasible.3
The key problem in the industry is compensation
and incentives, which is recognized in the Dodd–
Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection
Act (Dodd–Frank Act). The statute requires studies of
“alternative means for compensating nationally recognized statistical rating organizations that would create
incentives for accurate credit ratings.”4 In singling out
compensation for study, Congress correctly recognized
the link among compensation, incentive, and quality
of credit ratings. But there has been no feasible reform
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proposal. Fixing the problem requires positively linking
compensation and incentive.
A solution does not require a fundamental reconfiguration of the industry or regulation. The status quo
of the much-maligned industrial organization can be
maintained as a baseline reality. Rating agencies can still
play vital roles in the regulation of financial institutions
and investment portfolios. A solution can still continue
the existence of a highly concentrated market and
accept the much-criticized issuer-pay model. From the
perspective of regulatory feasibility, the simplest path
forward requires the least amount of structural change
to large, complex institutions and capital markets. This
contrarian approach counterintuitively leads to the
most effective reform.
The basic problem is this: industry concentration
coupled with the issuer-pay model reduces the incentive to compete and perform. Because incentive is
the condition necessary to induce competition, the
problem can be fixed by implementing a structured
compensation scheme overlaid onto the issuer-pay
model. The simplest solution is to establish a mandatory pay-for-performance compensation scheme in
which a fixed percentage of accrued revenue is ceded
to fund a performance bonus. At periodic intervals, the
regulator should award the bonus to the best performing rating agency for the period on a winner-take-all
basis. Proper incentive is achieved through mandatory
participation in a compensation competition. This idea
of pay-for-performance requires minimal regulatory
intrusion into the industry. The proposal benefits from
simplicity, administrability, and economic feasibility. It
can fundamentally reform the industry with minimal
disruption, even though the rating agencies themselves
may not warm to the idea of competing harder and
risking accrued revenue.
Poor Performance and Its Causes
Systemic poor performance of rating agencies poses
deep problems of public policy and economics. Rating
agencies played key roles in creating the bubbly condition leading to the financial crisis of 2008–2009. There
is a consensus narrative. Rating agencies systematically
overrated highly speculative structured finance securities, backed by residential mortgages. The results were
catastrophic. By 2010, more than 90 percent of the
subprime mortgage-backed securities issued between
2 • Banking & Financial Services Policy Report
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2006 and 2007 with triple-A ratings had been downgraded to junk bonds by Moody’s and S&P.5 In 2006,
Moody’s assigned triple-A ratings on 30 mortgagerelated securities per day, and 83 percent of these securities were ultimately downgraded.6 Rating agencies
engaged in egregiously lax and irresponsible business
practices, and systematically failed to do proper due
diligence. If rating agencies had rated these securities as junk bonds, the financial crisis would not have
occurred. Investor demand would have collapsed due
to regulatory restrictions on investments, and the securitization pipeline fueling the housing bubble would
have been broken.
The problems of the credit rating industry have
many causes. Commentators have identified the following major factors, which have been generally
accepted as a model of the problem.
• Conflict of Interest. Rating agencies are said to have an
inherent conflict of interest arising from the issuerpay fee structure.7 The issuer pays the fee for the
credit rating service, rather than the bond investor or
a subscriber to rating information. Issuers and investment bankers can “shop” for ratings, and this competition for business can compromise the objectivity
of rating agencies.8
• Lack of Competition. Rating agencies do not compete so much as coexist in a profitable market.9 The
market is heavily concentrated with Moody’s and
S&P dominating the market as a duopoly plus Fitch
as a major player. This “duopoly plus” state reduces
competiveness. Competition is further muted by the
industry custom of obtaining multiple ratings from
two or more rating agencies. Most new bond issues
carry multiple ratings.10
• Ineffectiveness of Reputation Capital. Reputation capital may ensure a certain level of quality, but it does
not incentivize performance well when there is
not a competitive market. Only the three duopoly
plus firms are large enough to meet the aggregate
demand of the bond market. The profitability of
the major rating agencies is primarily a function
of market environment and investors’ appetite for
fixed-income securities, which dictate the demand
for rating services.
• Regulatory Barriers. Regulatory barriers protect rating agencies from competitors. Fearing fly-bynight rating agencies, the SEC has parsimoniously
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granted regulatory status. At the same time, financial
regulators require institutional investors and brokerdealers to obtain credit ratings for debt securities in their investment portfolios. This regulatory
requirement is difficult to substitute, making credit
ratings necessary to the architecture of investment
regulation.These regulatory barriers have frozen out
new competitors, stifled competition among rating
agencies, and diminished the importance of reputation capital.
• Natural Barriers. Large rating agencies provide broad
coverage of an enormous credit market, and systematize credit information. This information platform
is important to investors and regulators. There is a
positive network effect to size and scale, that is, the
benefit of having the broad spectrum of bonds and
issuers in the very large credit market be rated under
presumably a common methodology. Newer and
smaller rating agencies lack this broad capability.
• Complexity of Modern Finance. For much of their
history, rating agencies analyzed plain vanilla corporate bonds. Structured finance securities such as
mortgaged-backed securities and collateralized debt
obligations are much more complicated in structure
and valuation. Credit analysis has become more difficult as financial markets, and securities instruments
have become more complex.
• Implicit Collusion with Investors. A “sinister danger”11 is
that investors also implicitly wanted overrated securities during the credit rating bubble. Inflated credit
ratings permitted regulated investors and portfolios
to invest in risky securities that were expected to
produce greater yields. They gave greater discretion
to pursue profitable yields than regulation would
have otherwise allowed.
This litany of causal factors shows that the industrial
organization of the credit rating industry is uniquely
problematic. Rating agencies are not optimally organized to provide the highest quality credit ratings,
and the problem has been difficult to solve. A major
problem has been the inadequate link between compensation and proper incentive. The effectiveness
of a reputation market as a bond on performance is
questionable at best. The lack of robust competition
and proper bonding of performance will continue to
undermine the quality of credit ratings even as rating agencies continue to play an important role in an
increasingly complex capital market.
Volume 33 • Number 4 • April 2014
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Compensation Competition as
the Solution
In regulating the credit rating industry, the goal of
regulation should be to create the necessary conditions
to stimulate robust competition where currently the
market does not work well due to cozy cooperative relationships among nominal competitors. Proper
incentive is the condition precedent to robust, positive
competition.The basic problem is not the lack of strong
competition per se. Competition can be good or bad.
A competitive race to the bottom in a frenzy for business engagements would be a bad thing. Strong competition is good only if it incentivizes a race to excel.
Competition is not the end, but the means.
Any reform measure must solve the incentive
problem. There is not a strong incentive to improve the
quality of credit ratings when the market is concentrated
among a few competitors whose business interests are
well protected by regulatory licenses, natural barriers of
entry, and the benefits of market share—a nicely profitable arrangement for rating agencies.
The inevitable outcome of a concentrated industry
need not be poor quality ratings. The problem is that
all three major firms consistently and concurrently
win because the engagement of one is not done to the
exclusion of the others and usually involves an engagement of the others as well. From a game theory perspective, the firms stand more in a cooperative posture
with each other than in a competitive one because they
are essentially partner monopolists. Regulatory reform
must change the game from a win-win to a win-lose
outcome to impart the proper incentive.
Mandating a pay-for-performance compensation
scheme would foster vigorous competition among
Moody’s, S&P, and Fitch. I assume that firms do not
like to lose when forced to compete for profit. This
assumption is empirically sound. A pay-for-performance
scheme does not naturally arise due to the unique
aspects of the industry. Easy profits and regulatory rents
undermine competitiveness and suppress the incentive
to excel. Reform must create the condition for competition through pay-for-performance incentives.
The Proposal
My proposal assumes that the industrial structure
and practices remain the same. It does not depend on
Banking & Financial Services Policy Report • 3

The scheme should permit different levels of contribution in a three-way game, but always maintain a
1-to-1 payout ratio. There is a simple solution to the
problem. The condition is met only when there are two
concurrently played sub-games within the larger competition. The “main game” would involve a three-way
competition with the bonus amount calculated as three
times the contribution of the smallest player. The “side
game” would involve a two-way competition with the
bonus amount calculated as the contribution in excess
4 • Banking & Financial Services Policy Report
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We can apply these simple allocation rules to a
compensation competition among Moody’s, S&P, and
Fitch. Suppose firms S, M, and F earn these revenues:
S(s), M(m), and F( f) where s > m > f. Since S earns
the most revenue of the three players, it needs to contribute only m, the contribution of the second largest
player. In each competition period, the payoffs and
losses can be generalized as follows:
Table 1: Model of Payouts
Players

Main

The contribution must be based on a fixed percentage of revenue, and not on a common flat contribution. A fixed contribution does not work because the
amount has relative value to each firm, and thus incentives and financial effects are not symmetric. The contribution must be a fixed percentage of revenue, which
would result in different contribution amounts by each
firm. This rule creates a technical problem: how do we
equitably and symmetrically allocate the bonus in light
of the different contributions made?

An example illustrates how the proposed rules work.
Assume that 5 percent of revenue for S, M, and F are
120, 100, and 50. Because S is the largest player, it can
only contribute 100, which is the contribution of the
second largest player, M. The smallest player, F, contributes 50. The total bonus pool is 250. The allocation
is based on the following rules: the winner in the main
game among S, M, and F gets 150; the winner in the
side game between S and M gets 100. If S or M wins
outright against all competitors, it would win the main
and side games and thus collect 250. If F wins the main
game, it would get 150, but since F did not contribute
to the side game it is precluded from this game. There
would still be a side game between S and M, who have
staked additional funds, for the 100.

Side

To start, we limit participation to Moody’s, S&P,
and Fitch. The three rating agencies would submit a
small portion of their revenue to fund a bonus pool of
deferred compensation, an incentive bonus. For illustrative purposes, let’s assume a bonus pool based on 5
percent of accrued revenue. At regular intervals, the
performance of each agency would be statistically evaluated by an independent agency based upon regulatory
disclosure requirements that for the most part are already
in place.12 Regulatory oversight would be limited to
independent confirmation of performance. Upon evaluation, the best performer is identified and the incentive
bonus would be awarded on a winner-take-all basis.

of the main-game allocation. Since the side game would
be between the two larger players only, the ceded
revenue is capped at the revenue contribution of the
second largest player. In a multiplayer game, these rules
maintain a 1-to-1 payout ratio as to all players, thus
maintaining fairness and symmetry of economic stakes.

Payoff

eliminating the issuer-pay model. The amount of fees,
payment forms, and other transactional considerations
remain private matters. But rating agencies should be
made to bond their performance. To accomplish this,
we do not need a heavy-handed regulatory intrusion,
only a marginal adjustment to the issuer-pay model.
The pay-for-performance scheme entails the creation
of a mandatory performance bonus. It is a hybrid
public–private compensation scheme. For the portion
of the revenue not ceded, the compensation scheme
would be determined by private actors, but the ceded
revenue would constitute a publicly administered compensation plan.

S or M

F

Win

2m + f

3f

Loss
(when S or M wins)

–m

–f

Net Win/Loss

2m – 2f

not applicable

There would always be a three-way “main game”
in which M, S, and F compete for these stakes: (1) if F
wins, three times its contribution; or (2) if M or S wins,
the entire bonus pool. If F wins the main game, there
would always be a “side game” between M and S for the
Volume 33 • Number 4 • April 2014

contributions they made into the bonus pool in excess
of F’s bonus.
The side game can yield a net win or a net loss,
depending on the size of F’s contribution relative to those
of M and S. Losing the main game but winning the side
game may result in a net gain if F’s contribution is much
smaller. However, if the three competitors are similar
sizes, winning the side game may result in a net loss.
For example, assume that the ceded revenues are
S = 100, M = 100, F = 40 (thus, the total bonus pool
is 240), and that F wins the main game and S wins the
side game. The results would be:
Table 2: Example of Positive Payout from
Side Game
S

M

F

120

0

Ceded revenue

–100

–100

–40

Net gain / loss

+20

–100

+80

Awards

120

Since the side-game allocation between S and M is
large enough to offset the loss of ceded revenue, S is a
net winner even though it lost the main game.
Now, assume that the ceded revenues are S = 100,
M = 100, F = 80 (thus, the total bonus pool is 280),
and again F wins the main game and S wins the side
game. The results would be:
Table 3: Example of Negative Payout from
Side Game
S

M

F

40

0

240

Ceded revenue

–100

–100

–80

Net gain / loss

–60

–100

+160

Awards

Here, even after winning the side game, S is a net
loser because F has won most of the bonus pool by
winning the main game. Thus, the side game is meaningful to the two losers of the main game, and the
winner can either net a gain or mitigate a loss, depending on the smaller competitor’s contribution of ceded
revenue.
Volume 33 • Number 4 • April 2014
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Under the above rules, all three rating agencies will
always have “skin in the game.” The game is perfect
from the perspective of symmetric incentives and equities among players of disparate wealth contributions.
Importantly, the competition is zero sum and the
“awards” are self-funded.
Financial Effects
The creation of a bonus pool raises an important
question: What is the financial effect of the proposal?
The financial analysis goes to the issue of economic and
business feasibility, which in turn is relevant to legal
feasibility as well. In the above discussion, I use an illustrative bonus amount of 5 percent. The financial effects
of this compensation competition will not materially
affect the companies’ operations.
If either Moody’s or S&P were to continually lose
the competition to the other such that it would incur
a perpetual loss of 5 percent of ceded revenue, there
would be a loss of equity value reflecting lost profitability. In a robust competition, however, no firm will
always win or lose. The actual range of potential valuation effects will be marginal.
It is unlikely that we would see a substantial net loss
in value for two reasons. First, the 5 percent is always
ceded, which means that the mandatory contribution
reduces revenue but does not add variance to a firm’s
financial results. The ceded revenue is a fixed obligation like overhead expense. Second, exposure to risk
from the competition can be reduced to zero through
perfect hedging. A shareholder needs to buy one share
each in the three firms of the duopoly plus to fully
invest in the credit rating sector. This investment strategy perfectly diversifies the unique risk of each firm
with respect to the bonus. In other words, a diversified
investor would assume no greater volatility of earnings
or cash flow due to the zero-sum nature of the compensation game. Thus, there is no significant loss of
value from the proposal.
The next question is whether the 5 percent figure
is feasible as a business proposition. The answer is
clearly “yes.” A review of the financial performances of
Moody’s and S&P shows that there is substantial room
to impose a mandatory contribution. Table 4 shows
the 2012 revenue, operating profit, and operating
margin of Moody’s, S&P, Goldman Sachs, Accenture,
Banking & Financial Services Policy Report • 5

Lazard, and FTI Consulting. These firms operate in
different industry sectors, but they provide significant
professional advisory services. Goldman Sachs is a leading investment bank, and Accenture, Lazard, and FTI
are leading advisory businesses. Table 4 provides financial data on these companies as compared to Moody’s
and S&P.
Table 4: Comparison of Financial Data
FY2012
Operating
($ million)
Revenue
Profit
Margin
Moody’s

1,958

947

48.4%

S&P

2,034

849

41.7%

Goldman Sachs

34,163

11,207

32.80%

Accenture

29,778

3,872

13.0%

Lazard

1,912

124

6.5%

FTI Consulting

1,577

169

10.7%

Moody’s and S&P have high operating profit margins
compared to other leading firms shown in Table 4. Keep
in mind that the above firms are different businesses, but
the different levels of financial performance are stark. A
ceding rate of 5 percent would have significant impact
on any business (of course), but the important takeaway
is that, on the whole, the rating agencies would not be
financially threatened in any way. If the operating profits of advisory services are the benchmark (7 percent to
13 percent), the rating agencies could cede as much as
25 percent of revenue and still be within the range of
financial feasibility. The proposed competition would
have a small impact on margins and financial operations,
but as the analysis also shows, the rating agencies would
have substantial economic incentive to win the game
because 5 percent ceded revenue is still a lot of money
at stake.
Implementation Issues and Objections
Coordination and Collusion
In light of the duopoly plus industry structure, one
concern may be whether rating agencies would implicitly coordinate or collude. The three rating agencies may
be tempted to take a “one for you, one for me” collusive
approach to the bonus payment. Forced competition
requires greater effort and quite probably greater investments that reduce profit. In a zero-sum game, the desire
to maintain the status quo and signal détente would be
great. This is not a serious concern.
6 • Banking & Financial Services Policy Report
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At the firm level, tacit coordination may appear possible due to the limited number of competitors, but as a
practical matter such a feat would be difficult to execute.
The situation here is not akin to price fixing in which
only a few decisions by a few actors would be needed
to coordinate with other firms. In a rating agency, such
centralized decisionmaking does not exist. Each rating
agency has more than a thousand credit analysts and
supervisors, and each rating requires a credit committee of various compositions of analysts, all of whom
would presumably be exercising independent judgments
on many thousands of bond issues and monitoring of
outstanding issues. Coordinating collusion cannot occur
absent an explicitly illegal, broadly disseminated (thus
easily discoverable) edict from the executive suite or the
boardroom.
Even if there is an illicit conspiracy to undermine the
competition from the top, such top-down coordination
cannot work when there are thousands of decision points
in each firm that must then be coordinated with those of
several other firms. Coordinating performance and statistical outcomes, many of which are subject to uncertainty
and market forces, would be practically infeasible. A
misstep in any coordinated action would quickly unravel
a coalition. A collusive agreement among three players
would be highly unstable, and would likely devolve into
active competition once the pattern of “one for you, one
for me” is broken due to cheating, miscalculation, or
some exogenous factor leading to unintended or unexpected outcomes.
Standard for Performance Assessments
A pay-for-performance scheme requires performance
standards. There are questions as to the metric to be
measured, the method for measurement, and the timing
of measurement and compensation. How does an agency
determine “the winner”? I do not offer or advocate a
specific assessment protocol. The purpose of this article
is to present the conceptual framework for reform.
However, I suggest that the problem of performance
measurement is neither insurmountable nor paramount.
The assessment criteria must be based on accuracy
and not on downward deviations of issues from ratings.
The focus should not be on how many issues were overrated since it would impose a bias toward underrated
securities. The magnitude of the error should count
but not directionality. Timeliness is also an important
Volume 33 • Number 4 • April 2014

consideration. It does the investor no good for a rating
agency to downgrade the debt of a company on the eve
of bankruptcy. Thus, directional correctness and timeliness are the two most important factors in formulating
the assessment criteria.
The evaluating criteria must cover performance
along all asset classes including difficult-to-rate structured finance instruments. This requirement would not
open up the possibility of gaming by the rating agencies through calculated changes in the business mix.
The mathematics of profitability precludes gaming the
business mix because the ceded revenue is only a small
portion of the fees earned. In concrete terms, a rating
agency would be unlikely to give up 95 percent of a
highly profitable business line to enhance its chances
of winning the 5 percent bonus pool, particularly since
complex instruments such as structured finance bonds
generate significantly higher profit margins.
Competent experts would be required to propose
a statistical method to measure the quality of performance. Such experts are numerous in the academy and
the financial profession. The SEC could also solicit the
three largest rating agencies as well as various constituents of the capital market, including bond investors, to
provide proposed rules and comments on the question
of assessment. The standard could be as simple as providing a universal standard of the probability of default per
each rating, and an assessment could be made based on
deviations from the defined standard as weighted by the
number of issues and time. Much of the data analysis can
be performed with the use of technology and algorithms.
Although the assessment should be primarily based
on quantitative measures, the SEC could add qualitative factors toward a weighted scorecard of best performance. Such factors can include compliance with rules
and regulations, independent assessments of governance,
management of conflict of interest, and quality of internal controls, all of which were issues addressed in both
the Credit Rating Agency Reform Act of 2006 and the
Dodd–Frank Act and implemented in SEC rules.
Can data analysis reveal “the winner”? Yes, because
there is an enormous volume of statistical data. Table 5
shows data on outstanding credit ratings reported
by nationally recognized statistical rating organizations
(NRSROs) to the SEC in 2011:13
Volume 33 • Number 4 • April 2014
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Table 5: Data on Outstanding Ratings as of 2011
S&P

Moody’s

Fitch

Other
NRSROs

Total

Financial
institutions

54,000

61,581

61,550

32,207

209,338

Insurance
companies

8200

4540

1657

5391

19,788

Corporate
issuers

44,500

30,285

13,385

11,116

99,286

Asset backed
securities

117,900

101,546

64,535

18,480

302,461

Government
issuers

965,900

841,235

363,897

14,694

2,185,726

1,190,500 1,039,187 505,024

81,888

2,816,599

Total

Because there are so many outstanding, maturing, and
defaulting issues at any given time, there is an enormous
volume of data from which we can cull reasonable inferences on performance. The industry custom of multiple
ratings makes the statistical analysis easier. There is great
overlap among the top three agencies. For instance, from
1976 to 2006, 62,496 new domestic issuances of nonconvertible debt were rated, and of these 98.2 percent
were multiple rated: 67.3 percent by two rating agencies and 30.8 percent by all three agencies.14 As another
example, in a representative sample of 2,514 corporate
bonds outstanding at the end of March 1997, Moody’s
had ratings on 92.5 percent and S&P 90.7 percent.15
There would be no problem in gathering a dataset based
on issues expiring and defaulting within defined periods
of time from which periodic quality assessments could
be performed.
The compensation competition is a repeat game,
occurring at regular intervals. It could be based on only
the bond or debt issues expiring or defaulting during that
period. These issues would be examined against the performance of the issue, initial rating assigned, and changes
in rating. Each rating agency would be evaluated on
the performance of the entire portfolio of expired and
defaulting issues against the objective performance standards set for each credit rating.
Perhaps the most serious criticism of the proposal is
what may be called the perfectionist’s challenge: the argument that any statistical analysis, however sophisticated,
would not be capable of determining the “true winner.”
There would be too many technical difficulties, such as
problems of data sampling, fluidity of credit ratings over
Banking & Financial Services Policy Report • 7

time, different portfolios of covered bond issues, and
numerous other factors that make identifying the best performer imperfect at best. If one were inclined to oppose
the idea of a compensation competition, there would be
many objections based on imperfections. A fair response
to this criticism might be, “le mieux est l’ennemi du bien”
(“the best is the enemy of the good”).16 We should not
let the lack of perfection get in the way of implementing
something that is a net good.
Epistemological certainty is not needed to implement
the policy objective. The standard for assessment should
be reasonably fitted to the objective so that, like any
performance bonus, the risk of arbitrariness is mitigated.
Potential errors do not undermine the policy goal. If
there is objective application of a rational standard, we
expect that any “errors” would average out for each
player. Since the compensation game is a classic repeatplay game, the mathematical expectation from an imperfect standard would be zero. In the long run, the risk of
error is diversified away.
Errors are simply a part of the real world, including the
legal process. One accepts that any standard of evaluation
may be imperfect and thus subject to criticism. Virtually
the entire panorama of human endeavors and observations is subject to imperfect evaluations and subjective
probability assessments. Many types of evaluative processes are far less quantitatively driven than the proposal
here and subject to the discretion of individual judgment:
just to name a few, the typical performance evaluations
of employees including those of CEOs, tenure reviews of
academics, strategic considerations in business planning,
medical evaluations, and judgments in civil trials.We seek
reasonable outcomes based on objective application of a
rational standard of evaluation.
“Who is the winner?” is the penultimate question.
The ultimate inquiry is “Are the players incentivized?”
From this perspective, a perfect assessment standard is
not needed to serve this policy end. If a rational standard
is applied objectively, the rating agencies subject to a
performance evaluation will be incentivized to produce
accurate credit ratings for the purpose of winning the
competition. That there is some uncertainty in the process would produce more incentive to win by a clearer
margin. Any potential for “errors” may actually benefit
the desired end. Thus, the policy objective is served
when the standard of evaluation is sufficiently connected
8 • Banking & Financial Services Policy Report
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to the criterion of accuracy, though perfect accuracy is
not needed.
Dodd–Frank’s Regulatory Foundation
The proposal requires that a regulator collect the
ceded revenue, assess performance, and award the bonus.
Regulation must create an agency body to oversee the
program, and must mandate rating agencies to collect
and maintain data on performance. In this respect, the
regulatory foundation necessary to implement the proposal has already been laid, which makes the implementation of the proposal easier and more feasible.
The Dodd–Frank Act mandates the regulatory framework necessary to collect, maintain, and report data on
performance. The rating agencies must provide ratings
based on a common system of ratings, including the
designation of alphanumeric ratings and the criteria applicable to each rating. The rating agencies already use similar rating symbols. Section 938 of the Dodd–Frank Act,
titled “Universal Ratings Symbols,” requires the SEC to
implement rules and procedures that
(1) [A]ssess the probability that an issuer of a security or
money market instrument will default, fail to make
timely payments, or otherwise not make payments
to investors in accordance with the terms of the
security or money market instrument;
(2) [C]learly define and disclose the meaning of any
symbol used by the [NRSRO] to denote a credit
rating; and
(3) [A]pply any symbol described in paragraph (2) in
a manner that is consistent for all types of securities and money market instruments for which the
symbol is used.17
There will be a universal standard against which the
performance of rating agencies can be judged and assessed.
The statute also imposes a regulatory reporting and disclosure structure, which has been partially implemented
through SEC rules.18 If additional rules are required to
produce a set of statistical disclosures, this can be done
through the auspices of the Dodd–Frank Act’s mandate.
With respect to an independent body or board that
would evaluate performance and award the incentive
bonus, the Dodd–Frank Act created a structure that
Volume 33 • Number 4 • April 2014

could fill this role. Section 932 creates an Office of
Credit Ratings within the SEC.19 Its charge is “to promote accuracy in credit ratings issued by nationally recognized statistical rating organizations; and … to ensure
that such ratings are not unduly influenced by conflicts
of interest.”20 The statute mandates that the staff should
have knowledge and expertise in debt instruments, and
that the Office of Credit Ratings should conduct annual
examinations of NRSROs.21 If additional expertise or
input is needed, the Office of Credit Ratings could be
composed of regulators, academics, and disinterested
industry professionals who would be tasked with analyzing performance and making recommendations as to
the award of a bonus, and could incorporate additional
methods such as an industry survey of investors and other
knowledgeable constituents.
The Dodd–Frank Act has enabled at least some of the
process-based rules necessary to administer a pay-forperformance compensation scheme. Although not fixing
the problem directly, it has enacted the regulatory precursors to fundamental reform based on greater positive
competition and correctly aligned incentives to perform.
Political Reality of Regulation
The economic and administrative feasibility of the
proposal here is well within the realm of practical possibility. More than the potential for collusion or the
difficulties of performance metric, the political reality of
effective regulation is the chief impediment to reform
of the credit rating industry. In any regulation affecting
corporate and Wall Street interests, there is always the
reality of political feasibility. Although no one denies
that better quality credit ratings are clearly a public good,
there would be significant political opposition to effective regulation. The idea of regulatory capture has long
been recognized.
The three rating agencies would oppose any attempt
to put any contingencies on accrued revenue, however
small. They would want to keep their rents. The proposal here means that the leading rating agencies would
have to work harder and incur more costs and investments in human capital to improve the quality of their
products and services. The political voices of Moody’s,
S&P, and Fitch would be significant.
Other powerful voices would speak against mandated
competition. Investment banks and corporate issuers,
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which yield greater political clout than the three rating
agencies, would be opposed as well. Issuers like overrated bond issues because they lower their costs of borrowing. The oft-cited conflict of interest arises from the
implicit threat that issuers and their investment bankers
might funnel rating business to more lenient rating agencies. Investment banks would have a business interest
in maintaining the status quo of this leverage. Higher
rated bonds are easier to manage in the issuance process,
again making the jobs of investment bankers easier.
Systemically higher credit ratings can increase the overall demand for bonds because they relax the regulatory
restrictions on bond investments.
Lastly, as mentioned previously, the “dirty secret”22 of
the problem of credit ratings is that investors also benefit
from overrated bonds. This is not to suggest that bond
investors like being fooled into bad investments. There
is a tradeoff for some bond investors: a freer hand in
pursuing greater yields on investments at the price of less
accurate credit ratings.
With all this said, the political picture is not so bleak.
Even as some bond investors may have conflicting interests,
many institutional investors actually rely on a credit rating
system that provides broad coverage of the bond market.
Many institutional bond investors desire a more accurate
credit rating system. Long-term players in the bond market, such as insurance companies, rely on credit ratings.
The bond market needs the credit rating system, and it is
quite plausible that a sufficient subset of the bond investor
community wants greater accuracy in credit ratings to offset
some of the countervailing political pressures.
Credit rating agencies exist because they provide a
quantum of value in intermediating information in the
capital markets and serve a quasi-regulatory role. If the
benefits of these functions were outweighed by the costs
of a continuously compromised credit rating system, the
future of rating agencies would be bleak. This is a possibility recognized by the rating agencies themselves. We
must be aware that there is a powerful political coalition
that has a significant economic interest in maintaining
the status quo, inherent flaws and costs notwithstanding.
Conclusion
Credit rating agencies suffer from a lack of competition and will to perform better than other agencies, which diminishes the quality of credit ratings. If
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competition in fact does not exist, regulation should
induce it. Large numbers of competitors are not needed
to achieve robust, positive competition. Contrary to
accepted wisdom, an industry of three firms can be competitive under the right conditions. The condition for
competition is created when a portion of compensation
is redirected from consideration for services rendered to
pay for performance. A mandatory winner-take-all bonus
scheme can augment the issuer-pay model. This modest,
at-the-margin change can create the necessary conditions
for robust, positive competition.
A compelling rationale supports a mandated, hybrid
public–private compensation scheme. Credit ratings are
more than just the opinions of a private actor; they are a
public good. Rating agencies enjoy a regulatory license
that necessitates their service and gives them market status, and the credit rating system exists in a capital market
that creates significant network externalities. Rating
agencies are private firms that report to shareholders, but
they also serve as public gatekeepers. The main goal of
regulation should be to change the incentives by altering
the relationship among rating agencies. By mandating
a self-funded bonus pool, each firm is forced to post a
bond on good performance and a winner-take-all tournament is created. At least with respect to the bonus,
rating agencies will not be oligopolists but instead will
be competitors. A change in the relationship will change
behavior.
Unlike other proposed reforms, this proposal does not
require a fundamental transformation of the industrial
organization and regulatory framework. It maintains the
duopoly plus industry organization and the issuer-pay
model. This contrarian perspective is the proposal’s principal benefit. It is fair to say that as much as 95 percent
of the status quo would be preserved.
The reform is economically feasible and administrable in a fair, coherent way. As with all reform of Wall
Street, the greatest barrier to reform is the politics of
regulation and the alignment of interests. In this regard,
there would be a sufficient constituency of bond investors who would be interested in seeing an improvement in the quality of credit ratings as evinced by the
passages of the Credit Rating Agency Reform Act of
2006 and the provisions relating to rating agencies in the
Dodd–Frank Act. Although these statutes did not fundamentally change the credit rating industry, they laid the
10 • Banking & Financial Services Policy Report
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foundation necessary to implement the reform proposal
advanced in this article.
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